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Abstract
This study explores whether for-profit home health agencies responded
differently from non-profit agencies to financial incentives embedded in the
Medicare prospective payment system. Agencies were able to receive higher
reimbursement per patient under the prospective payment system if they
adjusted the number of therapy visits or the type of visits for a two-month-
long episode. Agencies could also increase reimbursement by treating a patient
for multiple episodes of care, because prospective payments were made on a
per-episode basis. Using the Medicare Claims and Provider of Services Files
from 2001 to 2009, we examine differences between for-profit and non-profit
agencies in these practice patterns during the first nine years of the prospective
payment system. We find that for-profit agencies were more likely to adopt
most of these practice patterns than were non-profit agencies. This finding
suggests that for-profit agencies were more responsive to financial incentives,
and therefore disproportionately contributed to the increase in Medicare home
health spending under the prospective payment system. Policymakers could
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consider revising the current prospective payment system that gives agencies
incentives to distort practice patterns regardless of a patient’s health care needs.
Policy points
 For-profit home health agencies were more likely to respond to financial
incentives in the Medicare prospective payment system (PPS) than were
non-profit agencies.
 Non-profit agencies were also responsive to the financial incentives of
the PPS, although they changed their practice pattern less than for-profit
agencies.
 Policymakers might consider revising non-linear pricing for therapy visits
that provides financial incentives for agencies to distort service provision.
I. Introduction
Medicare home health care provides essential health services in the patient’s
home. It plays an important role in keeping patients at home instead of sending
them to more expensive care settings such as inpatient hospitals or skilled
nursing homes. However, Medicare home health spending has fluctuated
substantially under the different payment systems.
Per-capita Medicare home health spending drastically increased under the
prospective payment system (PPS), which was specifically introduced in 2000
to control rising home health spending. The rapid rise in expenditures during
the 2000s was perhaps surprising given the stated claim that Medicare wanted
to keep real expenditures from rising under the PPS. However, the PPS had
several strong financial incentives that promoted the opposite, a rapid increase
in expenditures. In particular, the incentives led to higher payment per two-
month-long episode. Medicare reimburses home health agencies for each
patient every other month, and the two-month-long treatment period is defined
as one episode. Home health agencies could increase the per-episode payment
by adjusting the number of therapy visits and shifting resources to therapy
visits – a highly reimbursed type of visit – from other types of visits. High
margins per episode made it financially attractive for agencies to continue to
recertify each patient’s episodes of care and treat them for additional episodes.
During the first nine years under the PPS from 2001 to 2009, both per-episode
spending and the number of episodes per patient increased, by 20.1 and 11.9
per cent respectively.1
These simple overall numbers may hide an interesting pattern: differential
responses to those financial incentives between for-profit and non-profit home
health agencies. Agency ownership status could matter because for-profit and
1MedPAC, 2012, 2013 and 2014; Kim and Norton, 2015b.
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non-profit providers could have inherently different operational goals. For-
profits distribute profits to shareholders and have stronger incentives to increase
profits, while non-profits have no well-defined shareholders.2 Employees in
non-profits also tend to be more altruistic decision-makers and thus would be
less responsive to financial incentives.3 Non-profit agencies may also aim to
maximise the quantity and quality of care rather than profits.
However, non-profit agencies might also provide services mainly driven
by the profit maximisation motive, and behave exactly like for-profits.4
For example, for-profit and non-profit hospitals provided identical amounts
of charity care after adjusting for their location.5 For-profit and non-
profit agencies might then react similarly to the per-episode incentives and
recertification incentives under the PPS.
This study begins with a simple question: ‘Did for-profit and non-profit
agencies respond differently to the financial incentives of the PPS?’.We answer
this question by comparing changes in practice patterns between for-profit and
non-profit agencies during the first nine years of the PPS. The PPS abruptly
changed how home health agencies were paid in 2001. For example, under the
prior system, treating a patient for an expanded period of timewas not profitable
becauseMedicaremade annual fixed payments per patient.6 In contrast, the PPS
makes fixed payments for each patient every other month. Margins per two-
month episode can be high due to the per-episode incentivesmentioned above.7
Agencies therefore found it financially attractive to serve patients for multiple
episodes under the PPS. Agencies might adopt new practice patterns gradually
because of the costs involved with changing them.8 Changing practice patterns
quickly could be challenging because it might take time for agencies to fully
understand the new payment system and disperse the new practice patterns
within the organisation.
Our analysis reveals that both for-profit and non-profit agencies gradually
changed their practice patterns responding to the PPS financial incentives, but,
overall, changes were greater among for-profit agencies. For-profits were more
likely to react to per-episode incentives and recertify each patient’s episodes
of care. We also find that for-profits’ practice pattern changes were different
across states with and without a certificate of need programme for home health
care.9
2Sloan, 2000.
3Duggan, 2000.
4Weisbrod, 1991.
5Norton and Staiger, 1994.
6McKnight, 2006; Porell, Liu and Brungo, 2006; Choi and Davitt, 2009; Murkofsky and Alston, 2009;
Huckfeldt et al., 2014.
7MedPAC, 2012, 2013 and 2014; Kim and Norton, 2015b.
8Kim and Jung, 2015; Kim and Norton, 2015b.
9Certificate of need laws restrict the entry of new agencies.
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Two previous studies explored for-profit and non-profit agencies’ response
to the PPS.10 Their main focus was, however, to compare agencies that entered
the market after the PPS with those that had entered before the PPS. Both
studies found that newer agencies that started their business after the PPS,
regardless of their ownership status, were more responsive to the financial
incentives of the PPS. This study builds on the prior two studies but extends
them in four important ways. First, it uses DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux
(1996)’s decomposition to flexibly compare the distributions of therapy visits
across episodes between for-profit and non-profit agencies. The decomposition
attributes differences in the distributions to either patient composition or
treatment patterns. Second, we include data after the 2008 revision to the PPS
that shifted the single payment increase at the 10th therapy visit to more gradual
payment increases. We examine for-profit and non-profit agencies’ responses
to this change. Third, we also examine changes in practice patterns among non-
profit agencies from 2001 to 2009. This enables us to check whether non-profit
agencies also responded to the PPS incentives. Finally, this paper contrasts
agencies in states with and without certificate of need laws that restrict the
entry of new agencies.
The goal of this study is to assess the different practice patterns of for-profit
and non-profit agencies. The results can help provide insight to policies for an
effective home health payment system.
Section II provides some background detail on Medicare and the PPS.
Section III describes the data and Section IV our empirical strategy. Results
can be found in Section V and conclusions in Section VI.
II. Background
Medicare is the federal health insurance programme in the United States,
primarily for people who are 65 or older, but also for non-elderly people
with disabilities or end-stage renal disease. In 2015, Medicare covered
approximately 55 million Americans, 17 per cent of the total population.11
Medicare covers a wide range of services including inpatient and outpatient
hospital care, post-acute care and hospice care. Home health care, the focus of
this paper, is one type of post-acute care service.
Medicare home health care provides six types of services: skilled nursing,
physical therapy, occupational therapy, speech therapy, home health aide and
medical social service visits. To be eligible for home health care, a beneficiary
must be housebound and have a need for part-time skilled care. A patient’s
physician must also certify the patient’s eligibility for home health care. Prior
acute care use is not required for home health care. Medicare home health
10Kim and Jung, 2015; Kim and Norton, 2015b.
11Kaiser Family Foundation, 2016a and 2016b.
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visits are free, so we focus on the agencies’ response to the PPS incentives
rather than the patients’.
In 2012, approximately 9.4 per cent of Medicare beneficiaries used home
health care, and 34 per cent of these home health patients received visits
immediately after being discharged from hospitals or skilled nursing homes.12
In the same year, Medicare home health spending accounted for 3 per cent
of total Medicare spending and 31 per cent of total Medicare post-acute care
spending.13 At first glance, home health spending looks relatively small, but it
could play an important role in curbing total health care spending because it
is a substitute for other more expensive care such as skilled nursing home or
hospital care.14
Medicare home health care was under the fee-for-service payment system
until 1997. The fee-for-service payment system reimbursed incurred treatment
costs with no limits on annual per-patient costs. Agencies provided as many
visits as possible and home health spending drastically increased under the fee-
for-service payment system. Between 1998 and 2000, Medicare implemented
the interim payment system that put a restrictive cap on the annual per-patient
costs. Agencies decreased the number of visits, particularly among highly sick
patients, under this restrictive cap.15 As a result, spending on home health care
plummeted, and about one-third of agencies exited the market, leaving 7,152
agencies in the market in 2000.16
In October 2000, Medicare home health care introduced the prospective
payment system. The PPSmakes a risk-adjusted fixed reimbursement for every
60-day episode of care. Because the PPS makes providers bear most of the
risk at the margin, it was expected to control the rising home health spending
that had occurred under the fee-for-service payment system. However, total
spending continued to rise gradually under the PPS. Its annual real growth rate
between 2001 and 2009 was 7.8 per cent, well above Medicare spending’s
annual growth rate of 3.7 per cent during the same period.17 The high growth
arose partially because the number of home health patients increased, but also
because per-patient home health spending increased.
The per-patient spending growth was mostly due to financial incentives
embedded in the PPS. The PPS enabled agencies to receive higher per-episode
payment amounts if they slightly adjusted practice patterns.18 For example, it
made fixed per-episode payments regardless of the number of visits provided,
but it reimbursed an agency about an extra $2,000 once it had provided 10
12MedPAC, 2014 and 2015.
13MedPAC, 2014.
14Benjamin, 1993; Lichtenberg, 2012.
15McKnight, 2006.
16National Association for Home Care and Hospice, 2010; MedPAC, 2012, 2013 and 2014.
17CMS, 2011.
18Kim and Norton, 2015a and 2015b.
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FIGURE 1
Changes in payment schedule for therapy visits under the PPS
Note: Panel A illustrates the Medicare prospective payment schedule for a patient in 2001. Medicare would
reimburse agencies for serving each patient every 60 days. This patient’s case-mix group changed once the
patient received the 5th and 10th visits. Panel B illustrates the Medicare prospective reimbursement schedule
for the same patient in 2008. This patient’s case-mix group changed at the 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th,
16th, 18th and 20th visits, instead of just the changes at the 5th and 10th visits.
therapy visits during one episode of care. Panel A of Figure 1 displays how
reimbursement amounts per episode changed as the number of therapy visits
increased. Given that the average baseline prospective payment amount per
episode was about $2,115 in 2001, the marginal revenue of $2,000 at the 10th
Fiscal Studies C© 2017 Institute for Fiscal Studies
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therapy visit was substantial. This provided a strong incentive for agencies to
target the 10th therapy visit.
In 2008, Medicare revised the payment system, in part to reduce the strong
incentives. Under the revised payment schedule, the payment rate increases at
the 5th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, 14th, 16th, 18th and 20th therapy visits, instead
of the enormous jump at the 10th visit (see Panel B of Figure 1).19 Medicare
chose these additional thresholds based on the empirical analysis conducted
using Medicare home health claims under the PPS. As a result, targeting of
the 10th visit disappeared after 2008. However, the payment rate increases
at the 6th, 14th and 20th visits are relatively larger than the increases at the
other thresholds. The payment rate could increase at most by about $650 by
providing the 6th visit, about $850 by providing the 14th visit and about $1,900
by providing the 20th visit. These increases are greater than those at other
thresholds ($300–500), providing another incentive for agencies to target the
6th, 14th and 20th therapy visits.20
In contrast, all other types of visits – skilled nursing, home health aide and
medical social service visits – are not compensated for extra visits. As a result,
agencies have an incentive to shift their resources to therapy visits and away
from other types of visits. Home health aide and medical social service visits
are less directly related to patient health status: home health aide visits involve
non-medical assistance related to eating, dressing and bathing; and medical
social service visits provide case management and mental health services.
These listed per-episode incentives led agencies to make high margins
per episode. High margins provided an incentive for agencies to continue
to recertify another episode of care for patients and treat them for multiple
episodes of care. Recertified patients could also be more profitable than new
patients because of the sunk fixed costs agencies spend learning about patients’
health care needs. The PPS allowed agencies to recertify an unlimited number
of episodes of care for patients as long as patients met eligibility conditions.
These high margins under the PPS attracted many new agencies to the
market. Between 2000 and 2011, the number of agencies rose from 7,152 to
11,633.21 Relatively low entry costs for agencies further accelerated agencies’
entry to the market.22 Starting an agency requires little capital investment
because labour is the main input cost in the home health industry.23 In addition,
in the early years of the PPS, only a small number of agencies were operating
in the market because many agencies went out of business under the interim
payment system.24
19CMS, 2007.
20Kim and Jung, 2015.
21National Association for Home Care and Hospice, 2010 and 2011.
22Huckfeldt et al., 2013.
23Polsky et al., 2014.
24MedPAC, 2010.
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Most of those new entrants were for-profits (95.3 per cent based on our
data). Entry by new for-profit agencies was concentrated in states with no
certificate of need (CON) programme, which do not regulate the entry of
new agencies. The 18 states with a CON programme, which do regulate their
FIGURE 2
Agencies in states with and without certificate of need programmes
Note: ‘Existing FP’ and ‘Existing NFP’ indicate for-profit and non-profit agencies that entered the market
prior to the PPS, respectively. ‘New FP’ and ‘New NFP’ indicate for-profit and non-profit agencies that
entered the market under the PPS, respectively.
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entry, are Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maryland,
Mississippi,Montana, New Jersey, NewYork, North Carolina, South Carolina,
Tennessee, Vermont, Washington, West Virginia and Washington DC. All
the listed states implemented the CON programme before 1980. In non-
CON states, the increase in home health patients under the PPS was mainly
driven by the entry of new for-profit agencies and slight expansion of
existing for-profits. In contrast, in CON states, the smaller increase primarily
came from expansion of the capacity of existing for-profit agencies (see
Figure 2).
A previous study found that new for-profit agencies that started business
under the PPSweremore likely to respond to the financial incentives of the PPS
than were incumbent agencies.25 Incumbent for-profit agencies also started to
mimic new agencies’ practice patterns if they were in the same market. Given
the different market shares of new and incumbent for-profit agencies across
CON and non-CON states, it is expected that for-profits’ response to the PPS
incentives relative to non-profits’ could be greater in non-CON states than
in CON states. Therefore, in addition to comparing for-profit agencies with
non-profit agencies overall, we also compare differences by whether the state
has CON laws for home health agencies, although the expected behaviour is
less clear.
III. Data
We use 2001 to 2009 Medicare home health claims and provider files, which
cover the first nine years of the PPS implementation. Medicare home health
claims cover 5 per cent of all Medicare home health patients and provide those
home health patients’ demographics, health characteristics and home health
service use. Provider files include all Medicare-certified home health agencies
across the nation and provide agencies’ basic information including ownership
status and location. We combine Medicare claims and provider files and create
a patient–agency linked data set.
We dropped patients who were under 65 years old. Patients enrolled
in Medicare health maintenance organisations (HMOs) were also excluded
because the PPS does not influence payment rates forMedicareHMOs. Finally,
we dropped patients served by government home health agencies (5.9 per cent).
The final data set has 1,424,839 patient-episode observations on 528,427
patients. See Table 1 for descriptive statistics of our sample in 2001 and
2009.
25Kim and Norton, 2015b.
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TABLE 1
Descriptive statistics in 2001 and 2009
2001 2009
For-profits Non-profits For-profits Non-profits
Outcome variables
Type of visit (%)
Therapy 47.3 55.8 53.1 65.6
Home health aide 37.4 33.9 23.5 26.0
Medical social service 10.2 13.3 6.8 12.0
Skilled nursing 90.0 88.0 93.2 90.0
Recertification (%) 38.9 27.1 57.5 29.8
No. of episodes 47,113 66,317 145,370 61,529
Patient characteristics
Race (%)
White 79.7 88.7 79.5 89.2
Black 14.6 8.5 13.3 7.3
Others 5.7 2.8 7.2 3.5
Female (%) 67.5 65.8 66.6 64.6
Medicare buy-in (%) 21.2 12.4 21.8 12.3
Prior acute-care stay (%) 31.9 48.8 27.8 59.1
No. of patients 29,333 47,781 69,615 42,662
Note: The unit of observation for outcome variables is each episode of care. The first four rows under ‘Type
of visit’ show the percentage of episodes with any therapy, home health aide, medical social service or
skilled nursing visit, respectively. Patients can receive multiple types of visits in each episode. The row
‘Recertification’ shows the percentage of episodes that were followed by another episode of care. The unit
of observation for patient characteristics is each patient.
IV. Empirical strategy
1. Per-episode incentive
We first compare for-profit and non-profit agencies in their targeting of the 10th
therapy visit. The non-linear pricing for therapy visits led agencies to target the
10th visit. The tendency for targeting could becomemore evident over time, and
the response could be different across for-profit and non-profit agencies. For
this examination,we utilise theDiNardo, Fortin andLemieux (hereafter ‘DFL’)
decomposition.26 The DFL method is ideal for this analysis because it checks
for differences in the entire distribution of the number of therapy visits between
for-profit and non-profit agencies. The DFLmethod decomposes the difference
in the distribution of the number of therapy visits between for-profit and non-
profit agencies into two parts: (1) differences attributable to the observable
variables affecting the number of therapy visits (composition effects) and (2)
26DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996.
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differences attributable to the mechanism determining the number of therapy
visits (structure effects). In particular, we focus on the structure effects that
measure the agencies’ response to the payment incentives and examinewhether
for-profit agencies were more likely than non-profit agencies to target the 10th
therapy visit. We examine the differences between for-profit and non-profit
agencies in 2001, 2007 and 2008 to check how agencies changed the number
of therapy visits over time.We pick the years 2007 and 2008 becauseMedicare
revised the reimbursement schedule for therapy visits in 2008. This allows us
to see whether the home health agencies’ behaviours changed following the
change in reimbursement.
Here we explain in detail how the DFL method decomposes the changes in
the distribution of the number of therapy visits between 2007 and 2008.27 This
explains how Panel A of Figure 4 is derived; we discuss the graph in more
detail in Section V.1.
The actual distributions of the number of therapy visits in 2007 and in 2008
are expressed as follows:
∫
f 2007(V T )dV T ≡
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx(1)
∫
f 2008(V T )dV T ≡
∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2008)dx,(2)
whereV T represents the number of therapy visits per episode, t refers to the year
and x represents other characteristics affecting the number of therapy visits,
including patient and agency characteristics, and seasonality. f 2007(V T |x) is
the therapy visits number determination mechanism in 2007, which maps
observables to the distribution of the number of therapy visits. The density
h(x |t = 2007) is the probability density function of observables in 2007.
We then decompose the difference between equations 1 and 2:
∫
f 2008(V T )dV T −
∫
f 2007(V T )dV T ≡
∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2008)dx(3)
−
∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx
+
∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx
−
∫
f 2007(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx .
27DiNardo, 2002; Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo, 2010.
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∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx is the counterfactual distribution, which
indicates what the distribution of the number of therapy visits would be in
2007 if the therapy visits number determination mechanism were the same
as in 2008. Thus, the first two terms on the right-hand side of equation 3
describe the difference in the number of therapy visits caused by the change
in observables between 2007 and 2008, holding the therapy visits number
determination mechanism in 2008 fixed (composition effects). The last two
terms describe the difference in the number of therapy visits between 2007
and 2008 attributable to the change in the therapy visits number determination
mechanism between 2007 and 2008, holding the value of observables in 2007
fixed (structure effects). This difference measures agencies’ adjustment in the
number of therapy visits responding to payment incentives, assuming that there
were no omitted variables affecting the number of therapy visits.28
The DFL method computes the counterfactual distribution, weighting the
actual distribution in 2008 with the variable ωi :∫
f 2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2007)dx ≡
∫
ωi f
2008(V T |x)h(x |t = 2008)dx,(4)
where
ωi = h(x |t = 2007)
h(x |t = 2008)(5)
= Pr (t = 2007|x)i
/
Pr (t = 2007)
Pr (t = 2008|x)i
/
Pr (t = 2008) ,
where Pr (t = 2007|x)i andPr (t = 2008|x)i are computed for each observation
i based on a probit model for the probability that the sample is from 2007
and 2008 respectively. Pr(t = 2007) and Pr(t = 2008) are the unconditional
probabilities that the sample is from 2007 and 2008 respectively.
To sum up, we use the DFL method to decompose the changes in the
distribution of the number of therapy visits between 2007 and 2008 in the
example above. We also use the DFL method to decompose the differences
in the distribution of the number of therapy visits between for-profit and non-
profit agencies.
In contrast to the strong incentives to provide at least 10 therapy visits,
the PPS gave agencies no additional compensation for extra visits for home
health aide or medical social service. To examine how for-profit and non-
profit agencies changed the types of visits to provide over time, we run an
episode-level regression (equation 6) where Pr(TypeOfVisit) represents dummy
28Olson, 1998.
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variables indicating whether each patient received at least one visit of the
relevant type (therapy, home health aide or medical social service) in each
episode. We consider an interaction term between Year (year dummy variables
with year 2001 as a reference group) and FP (indicator of episodes served
by for-profit agencies) because for-profits may be more likely to increase the
provision of therapy visits but to decrease aide or medical social service visits
over time under the PPS. Only about 7.2 per cent of agencies changed their
ownership status between 2001 and 2009, and therefore we do not exploit a
change in ownership status as the main source of variation. α3 measures the
difference in the likelihood of providing each type of visit between for-profits
and non-profits each year, relative to the differences in 2001. α3 is expected to
be positive if Pr(TypeOfVisit) is the likelihood of receiving any therapy visits,
but negative for home health aide or medical social service visits.
Pr (TypeOfVisit)kijt = α0 + α1Yeart + α2FPjt(6)
+α3Yeart × FPjt + α4Agency jt
+α5Patientkijt + α6Seasonalitykt + εkijht,
where k, i, j and t represent an episode, patient, agency and year. Agency
represents agency characteristics including institutional affiliation (free-
standing versus hospital- or skilled-nursing-home-affiliated) and number of
treated patients. Patient refers to patient demographics and health risk factors
such as age, gender, race, Medicare buy-in status (a proxy for a low-
income beneficiary because buy-in programmes help low-income beneficiaries
pay Medicare premiums), any prior stays in a hospital or skilled nursing
home, common health conditions among home health patients (diabetes,
hypertension, heart failure, chronic ulcer of skin, osteoporosis, cardiac
dysrhythmias, stroke, dementia, pneumonia, other forms of chronic ischaemic
heart disease, cancer, mental disorders and arthritis) and Charlson comorbidity
counts. We also control for quarter-of-year dummies, Seasonality, to capture
seasonality in service provision. All regressions use a linear-probability model
instead of probit regressions because the linear-probability model provides a
more straightforward inference for the interaction term estimates.29 Standard
errors are clustered at the agency level.
2. Recertification incentive
The per-episode payments provided a strong incentive for agencies to continue
to recertify each episode of care for a patient and treat them for multiple
29Ai and Norton, 2003; Norton, Wang and Ai, 2004; Karaca-Mandic, Norton and Dowd, 2012.
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episodes of care. To compare how for-profit and non-profit agencies recertified
patients, we run an episode-level regression:
Pr (Recertification)kijt = β0 + β1Yeart + β2FPjt(7)
+β3Yeart × FPjt + β4Visitkijt
+β5Agencyjt + β6Patientkijt
+β7Seasonalitykt + εkijht,
where Pr(Recertification) is a dummy variable indicating whether a patient was
recertified for the next episode of care. In addition to the covariates in regression
6, we also control for Visit, splines of the number of visits (regardless of type
of visits) where the knots are 5, 10, 15, 20, . . . , 55 and 60. We control for
the number of visits provided because patients who received relatively high
numbers of visits could be sicker. β3 measures the difference in the likelihood
of recertification between for-profits and non-profits each year, relative to the
differences in 2001. β3 is expected to be positive. Standard errors are clustered
at the agency level.
3. CON versus non-CON states
We also do all the analyses regarding the per-episode incentive and the
recertification incentive separately for agencies located in states with and
without CON. We then compare the results across the analyses for CON and
non-CON states.
V. Results
1. Per-episode incentive
The DFL decomposition results indicate clear differences between for-profit
and non-profit agencies in the number of therapy visits provided (see Figure 3).
Comparing the actual distribution of non-profit agencies and the counterfactual
distribution (which illustrateswhat the distribution of therapy visits would have
been among non-profit agencies if non-profits had determined the number of
therapy visits to provide in the way for-profits did) in the DFL decomposition
of both 2001 and 2007, we find that for-profit agencies were generally more
likely to provide 10–14 therapy visits and less likely to provide fewer than 10
therapy visits than non-profit agencies.
However, inconsistent with our expectation, the discrepancy between for-
profit and non-profit agencies in targeting the 10th visit stayed almost the same
over time. Comparing the counterfactual distribution with the non-profits’
actual distribution from 2001 to 2007 reveals that non-profit agencies became
more like for-profit agencies over time. This suggests that non-profits also
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FIGURE 3
Number of therapy visits across for-profit and non-profit agencies in 2001 and 2007
Note: ‘NonProfit’ and ‘ForProfit’ represent the actual distribution of the number of therapy visits among
non-profit and for-profit agencies, respectively. ‘Counterfactual’ illustrates what the distribution of the
number of therapy visits would be among non-profit agencies, assuming the observable characteristics of
non-profit agencies and the for-profit agencies’ mechanism for determining the number of therapy visits. In
both panels, we restrict the sample to episodes with at least one therapy visit provided.
increasingly adopted the targeting behaviour, although their level of adoption
was still lower than that of for-profit counterparts.
The targeting of the 10th therapy visit suddenly disappeared in 2008 when
Medicare modified the way the number of therapy visits was factored into
reimbursement amounts (see Panel A of Figure 4). Interestingly, the actual
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FIGURE 4
Number of therapy visits across for-profit and non-profit agencies in 2007 and 2008
Note: In Panel A, ‘Year 2007’ and ‘Year 2008’ represent the actual distribution of the number of therapy
visits in 2007 and 2008, respectively; ‘Counterfactual’ illustrates what the distribution of the number of
therapy visits would be in 2007 with the observable characteristics of the year 2007, holding the therapy
visits number determination mechanism in 2008 fixed. In Panel B, ‘NonProfit’ and ‘ForProfit’ represent the
actual distribution of the number of therapy visits among non-profit and for-profit agencies, respectively;
‘Counterfactual’ illustrates what the distribution of the number of therapy visits would be among non-
profit agencies, assuming the observable characteristics of non-profit agencies and the for-profit agencies’
mechanism for determining the number of therapy visits. In both panels, we restrict the sample to episodes
with at least one therapy visit provided.
Fiscal Studies C© 2017 Institute for Fiscal Studies
How home health agencies’ ownership affects practice patterns 485
distribution in 2008 and the counterfactual distribution (which illustrates what
the distribution would be in 2007, assuming the observables of the year 2007
and the therapy visits number determination mechanism of the year 2008) are
almost the same, indicating that the huge change in the actual distribution
between 2007 and 2008 was mostly due to agencies’ response to the change in
the reimbursement schedule, not to changes in observables.
Both for-profit and non-profit agencies stopped targeting the 10th visit in
2008 (see Panel B of Figure 4). Instead, for-profits started to target the 14th
visit, where the average marginal revenue was $850, and non-profits targeted
the 6th visit, where the average marginal revenue was $650. Overall, for-profits
provided more visits than non-profits even after controlling for observable
characteristics. This might be because the reimbursement rate continues to
increase with the number of visits under the revised PPS.
The regression analyses suggest that, as expected, both for-profit and non-
profit agencies gradually adjusted the types of home health visits provided.
Figure 5 displays the predicted probabilities that a patient would receive each
type of visit at least once per episode. Both for-profits and non-profits increased
the provision of therapy visits (which promised a substantial marginal benefit
for a higher number of visits) over time, but non-profits were always more
likely to provide therapy visits by up to 4.1 percentage points. Non-profit
agencies’ patients might have unobserved conditions requiring more therapy
visits.
As expected, over time, both for-profits and non-profits decreased the
provision of home health aide andmedical social service visits – for which they
are not compensated for providing extra visits – and the changes were greater
for for-profit agencies. The likelihood of a for-profit agency providing home
health aide and medical social service visits decreased by 15 and 4 percentage
points respectively between 2001 and 2009, but the corresponding values were
8 and 2 percentage points for non-profit agencies. These findings suggest that
agencies indeed shifted their resources to therapy visits away from two other
unprofitable types of visits and that the changes were greater for for-profit
agencies except in the provision of therapy visits.30
As a robustness check, we reran the main analysis with agency fixed effects,
and found substantially the same patterns of results.31
2. Recertification incentive
Figure 6 displays the predicted probabilities that each patient would get
recertified for another episode of care. For-profit agencies gradually increased
the likelihood of recertification from 0.35 in 2001 to 0.50 in 2009. In contrast,
non-profit agencies’ likelihood of recertification did not change much around
0.35.
30See Table A1 in the online appendix for full regression results.
31See Figures A1–A4 in the online appendix.
Fiscal Studies C© 2017 Institute for Fiscal Studies
486 Fiscal Studies
FIGURE 5
Types of visits under the PPS
Note: Each panel displays the predicted probabilities that a patient would receive that type of visit at least
once per episode.
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FIGURE 6
Recertification under the PPS
Note: This graph displays the predicted probabilities that each patient would get recertified for another
episode of care.
We also find that agencies were more likely to recertify older, black, lower-
income Medicare beneficiaries. In addition, free-standing agencies were more
likely to recertify patients than agencies affiliated with hospitals or skilled
nursing homes. The size of agencies was not related to the likelihood of
recertification.32
3. CON versus non-CON states
We find a difference in for-profit and non-profit agencies’ targeting behaviour
across CON and non-CON states (see Figure 7). Comparing the actual
distribution between for-profits and non-profits, their discrepancy in targeting
behaviour was greater in non-CON states than in CON states, both in 2001 and
in 2007. The comparison between the counterfactual and non-profits’ actual
distribution indicates that the discrepancy between the two groups was greater
in non-CONstates than inCONstates in 2001.However,we find the opposite in
2007. That is partially because targeting among non-profit agencies increased
to a greater degree in non-CON states than in CON states. This might be
because non-profits in non-CON states quickly changed their practice patterns
to survive in a market where competition was rapidly increasing. Non-profits
in CON states were less likely to face such pressure. It is, however, uncertain
whether these differences are statistically significant.
32See Table A2 in the online appendix for full regression results.
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FIGURE 8
Types of visits across CON and non-CON states
Note: Each panel displays the predicted probabilities that a patient would receive that type of visit at least
once per episode.
We also explore for-profit and non-profit agencies’ adjustment in types
of visits and recertification across non-CON and CON states (see Figures 8
and 9). We find that both for-profits and non-profits were less likely to provide
home health aide and medical social service visits in non-CON states than
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FIGURE 9
Recertification across CON and non-CON states
Note: Each panel displays the predicted probabilities that each patient would get recertified for another
episode of care.
in CON states, but we do not find any significant differences in for-profits’
adjustment in types of visits or recertification relative to non-profits’ across
non-CON and CON states.
VI. Conclusion
The Medicare home health PPS, the system that was introduced to curb rising
Medicare home health spending, provided unintended financial incentives that
contributed to a significant increase in per-capita home health spending. As
expected, for-profit agencies were more likely to respond to PPS incentives.
They were more likely to target the 10th therapy visit until 2007 and the
14th visit after 2007 to benefit from significant marginal revenue on those
threshold visits. For-profit agencies were also more likely to shift resources
away from home health aide and medical social service visits, which do not
get compensation for additional visits. A patient who was served by a for-
profit agency was also more likely to get recertified for another episode of
care.
Given that the start-up cost of a home health agency is relatively low, it
is likely that the incentives built into the PPS attracted an increasing number
of for-profit agencies. This is important because for-profit agencies prioritised
profits more strongly and thus contributed to the increase in total Medicare
home health spending. Had the home health industry been dominated by
non-profit agencies, the increase in total spending might have been lower.
However, it is also interesting that non-profit agencies were also responsive
to the financial incentives of the PPS, although they changed their practice
pattern less than for-profit agencies.
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The current prospective payment system provides financial incentives for
agencies to distort service provision, not necessarily corresponding to patients’
health needs. Policymakers might consider revising the current payment
system, in particular non-linear pricing for therapy visits. Medicare replaced
the single payment threshold at the 10th visit with multiple thresholds in 2008,
in response to agencies’ targeting of the 10th therapy visit, but the revised
payment system still encouraged agencies to target either the 6th or the 14th
visit. To restrict agencies’ targeting behaviour, Medicare also requires that
agencies check whether a patient needs more therapy visits on the 13th and
19th visits.33 However, as long as a payment system has non-linear pricing for
therapy visits and thus provides financial incentives for agencies to target a
certain number of visits, it might be hard to fully prevent agencies’ targeting
behaviours. Also, the current payment schedule incentivises agencies to shift
resources away from home health aide or medical social service visits, but
these two types of visits could be important for the quality of a patient’s health
care.
Interestingly, an increase in total Medicare home health spending could be
viewed as desirable. Medicare home health care holds the potential to create
savings in total Medicare spending because it is substitutable with more costly
health care services. Home health care can replace more expensive skilled
nursing home or inpatient care by allowing patients to receive necessary
medical care at home.34 This substitution would lower health spending, an
important benefit given the current anti-spending political environment. While
such an expansion of home health care spending may be beneficial, an increase
in home health spending caused by the inadvertent inclusion of improper
incentives is concerning. In future work, we hope to assess how the financial
incentives embedded in the PPS affected patient health outcomes to provide a
comprehensive understanding of the effects of the PPS on social welfare.
Future reimbursement policies must be carefully structured to encourage
home health agencies to effectively balance cost efficiency and quality of
care.
Supporting information
Additional supporting information may be found in the online version of this
paper on the publisher’s website:
• Appendix
33CMS, 2014.
34Benjamin, 1993; Lichtenberg, 2012.
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